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BOOK REVIEWS
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY. By Grant
Gilmore. (Little, Brown & Company 1965. Pp. 1508. $45.00).
Shortly after drafting the Uniform Sales Act, Professor Wil-
liston of Harvard Law School compiled a four-volume treatise
which became the standard reference work on the law of sales.
Indeed, in sales litigation, a court was more likely to cite WiT-
iston On SaZes' as authority than the governing Uniform Sales
Acts.
A half-century later, a parallel situation has developed in a
related area of commercial law. Professor Grant Gilmore, co-
reporter of the Uniform Commercial Code article on personal
property security has recently completed a definitive two-volume
treatise on this subject. It is likely that the sales parallel will
be complete as this book becomes in its time the guiding light to
assist bench and bar through the maze of complex problems dealt
with in the secured transactions article of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.
One of the remarkable characteristics of this book-which may
prove to be its detraction to anyone who would seek the answer
to complex legal questions in the form of a one sentence black-
letter rule of law-is the extensive historical reconstruction of
the pre-Uniform Commercial Code law, usually as a prelude
to an analysis of the Code provisions. Since the basic source
of personal property security law in this country for the next
generation will be Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial
Code (South Carolina has recently become the forty-fifth state
to enact the Code), one may have thought that a modern treatise
on the subject would have confined the discussion to an analysis
of that statute. Professor Gilmore tells us in the preface why
analysis of pre-Code law was necessary.
The particular shape and structure which Article 9 assumed
can be understood only in light of the state of law from
which it issued . . . . Article 9, far from having been a
break with the past, is a continuation of it. The pre-code
law, which largely determines both the form and substance
of Article 9, will continue, for a generation or more, to be a
vital force in its construction and interpretation.
1. WILISTON, SALES (3rd ed. 1948).
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After a problem area has been brought to the surface and
viewed from the vantage point of an historical observer, the
author examines the Uniform Commercial Code treatment with
the insight provided him as a co-reporter for Article 9. The
trouble spots are confronted and exposed with a clear analysis
of the issues involved. At this stage of the discussion, reference
is frequently made to the "draftsman" of the applicable Code
section with such apparent detachment that the reader is in-
clined to forget that this "anonymous" person is actually the
author of the book. This fact does not, however, lead to a
glossing over of the occasional defects which appear in the Code
upon this second and reflective look. Gilmore the commentator
pulls no punches in dealing with Gilmore the drafter in pointing
out possible ambiguities or inconsistencies in the Code language.
This book's approach may be illustrated by its treatment of the
important and recurring problems encountered by the prac-
titioner in attempting to establish an effective inventory financ-
ing arrangement. Only after a detailed discussion of the havoc
wrought over the past forty years by the United States Supreme
Court decision of Benedict v. Ratner2 requiring a policing of
collateral and its proceeds as a prerequisite to the validity of
the security arrangement, is Code section 9-205 introduced. The
reader is then able to fully comprehend the significance of the
language of that section which provides "a security interest is
not invalid or fradulent against creditors . . . by reason of the
failure of the secured party to require the debtor to account for
proceeds or replace collateral." The long controversy over the
effectiveness of the "after-acquired property clause" in a secur-
ity agreement and its importance to effective inventory financ-
ing is examined in depth before the Code section which expressly
validates this provision is considered. These points, along with
the treatment of the continuing security interest in the proceeds
from the sale of collateral and the validation of arrangements
for future advances, are finally tied together so that the reader
observes the construction of the "floating lien" whereby a secured
party takes a security interest which "floats" over all of his
debtor's present and future business assets.
Continuing this example of the treatment of the floating lien
in inventory financing, Professor Gilmore plunges headlong
into the depths of the almost unbelievably complex but very
2. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
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real problems which may be encountered in conflicts between
the secured creditor and the trustee in bankruptcy in competing
for the spoils of the limited assets of the debtor. Again, history
background and basic policy considerations are called upon to
make the discussion more comprehensible. Only after a careful
dissection of section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act3 making cer-
tain preferential transfers of property by insolvents to secure an
antecedent debt voidable by the trustee in bankruptcy, and a look
at the trustee's powers and his statutory personality, is the reader
told-or reminded-of the specific problems that may arise. We
are told that there remains an open question as to whether the
secured party's interest in the after-acquired property is a trans-
fer for an antecedent debt voidable as a bankruptcy preference
despite the Code language of section 9-108-that such a security
interest "shall be deemed to be taken for new value and not as
security for an antecedent debt." The arguments which the
trustee in bankruptcy will make to invalidate this arrangement
as being in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act and the counter-
arguments which will be made by counsel for the secured party
are clearly and precisely set out.
While a considerable portion of this book is devoted to a dis-
cussion of the problems of inventory financing-Article Nine
is sometimes referred to as a "floating lien" statute and Pro-
fessor Gilmore as drafter and commentator seems to be fascinated
almost to the point of obsession with its immense complexity-
the books does not ignore some of the more mundane aspects of
secured financing. The every-day problems which the practi-
tioner encounters in this area of practice are treated. The
different types of security devices depending upon the objectives
sought are explained, including the methods of protection
against third parties, rights in the collateral before and after
default, and problems of priorities between conflicting claims
to collateral. Under the latter heading, the chapters dealing with
the complex matters of circular priority systems and priority of
the United States for debts and taxes are especially well done-
characteristic of the tendency of this book to reach its highest
level when dealing with the more difficult problems of secured
financing.
In a book of this scope and length the quality of the index will
often be the measure of its usefulness as a quick reference tool
3. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964).
[Vol. 18
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for the busy lawyer. The author has accomplished this purpose
by providing several indexes designed to accommodate the
special circumstances of the book. The first collects all specific
references in text and footnotes to sections of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. Two subject matter references separate the Uni-
form Commercial Code material from the non-code and pre-code
law.
In summary, this is a book to be read through as a general
orientation to Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code
and then to be placed at a convenient place in the practitioner's
library for ready reference as problems arise.
ROBERT W. FosTER
Professor of Law
University of South Clarolina
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THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA. By
Anton-Hermann Chroust. (University of Oklahoma Press, 1965,
Pp. 696, two vol. boxed. $15.00).
This is a scholarly work, but not oppressively so. It even has
some sensational aspects, at least for those lawyers who have
assumed that their profession, from a position of public respect
and high authority, has provided our country's leadership from
its beginnings. Mr. Chroust makes it clear that at several points
in American history lawyers not only enjoyed little respect or
authority, even in the courts, but operated under the threat of
actually being abolished as a group because of their obstruction
of the democratic ideals that were supposed to be developing on
our shores.
Respect for the lawyer in this country has generally followed
respect for the law and that of course is as it should be, but
what is hard for us to comprehend is that in most of the Ameri-
can colonies the law, or at least the English common law, was
held in marked disrespect. In Massachusetts for example the
Puritan clergymen staunchly maintained that the only justice
which could ever be required to be administered between their
parishioners should be administered by them in accordance with
the "Word of God." A resolution of 1639 in Connecticut pro-
vided that "the word of God should be the only rule to be
attended unto in ordering the affayres of the government in this
plantation." In the Quaker Utopia of Pennsylvania disputes
were settled for some time by "peacemakers" who had no rules
to follow other than those of their own consciences. Even in the
colonial governments which did not claim the right to administer
justice in accordance with their interpretation of Holy Writ,
there was a general resentment at being bound by the "despotic"
common law of England. There was a frequent attempt to de-
clare that only the common law rules which were in keeping
with the "traditions and institutions" of the particular colony
would be controlling. With no judicial reports to establish
precedents and no legal training or even education on the part
of most of the judicial officers, justice was largely administered
under such a system on a case-to-case basis. And this seems to
be the way the colonists wanted it. Summary judgments by
ignorant laymen were preferable to giving the despised lawyers
and the despised common law a monopoly in the courts.
[Vol. is
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Gradually, however, all of the Utopian schemes of law with-
out lawyers simply proved unworkable and it was realized that,
like it or not, knowledgeable specialists in legal matters were
needed. Litigants who were distrustful of their ability to try
their own cases, as their governments expected them to do,
happily turned to attorneys-in-fact to represent them. There
being no trained bar in most of the early colonies, these court-
room assistants were mostly pretentious laymen-pettifoggers,
to use the word which Mr. Chroust constantly uses to describe
them. Such an interim situation could not, of course, last longer
than the time needed to produce a trained and conscientious bar.
This development, once it started, was rapid in all of the
colonies and on the eve of the American Revolution we had in-
deed the situation which we as lawyers have always taken pride
in, without (not having read Mr. Chroust's book) appreciating
the vicissitudes which preceded it-the situation of legal lead-
ership, not only in the administration of justice in the courts but
also in the administration of government. Of the fifty-six
signers of the Declaration of Independence no less than twenty-
five were trained lawyers, as were thirty-one of the fifty-five
delegates to the Constitutional Convention.
In Mr. Chroust's analysis of the status of law and the lawyers
in each of the colonies, the situation in South Carolina is describ-
ed as completely apart from the typical. In the first place, after
the ill-fated Fundamental Constitutions of John Locke and Lord
Ashley, the English common law was formally accepted as the
fundamental law of the Colony. Secondly, our courts were earlier
organized and on a sounder basis than in most of the other col-
onies. The power of the courts to admit to their bars was well
controlled and the education of the early South Carolina lawyers
was much higher than in the other colonies, largely because the
aristocratic traditions of Charleston families had compelled their
sending the sons who aspired to be lawyers to London for train-
ing in one of the Inns of Court. Mr. Chroust makes the comment
that apparently no one in Charleston believed that quality edu-
cation was available west of London and says that John Rut-
ledge was completely unaware of the existence of any college in
America prior to his attendance at Stamp Act Congress in 1765.
Be that as it may, Mr. Chroust tells us that of the thirty or so
lawyers who comprised the Charleston Bar at the time of the
Revolution no less than twenty-four had been educated in one
19661
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of the Inns of Court. He points out, however, that this situation
gave rise to at least one unfortunate result. It precluded the
organization of an effective bar association, such as the one in
New York which had advanced the standing and the standards
of their lawyers so remarkably. He theorizes:
Also the fact that the "Carolina Templars," who were
mostly the scions of the exclusive class of wealthy and aris-
tocratic planters, probably had a low opinion of the legal
and social qualifications of their locally trained brethren
and, hence, might have refused to consort with them, may
have prevented the formation of a sense of professional
solidarity and common purpose among the South Carolina
lawyers. Barristers owed allegiance to their particular Inn
but, as a rule, had no feelings of allegiance to the legal
profession as such.
The pre-eminence of the profession in the days just preceding
the Revolution was, unfortunately for the lawyers and for the
nation, not long to endure. Mr. Chroust attributes its rapid
decline in the post-Revolutionary years to many factors. A sub-
stantial number of the leaders of the bar had left the country
or retired from practice, many because they had been loyalists.
A fresh hatred for all things English, including again the
common law, had arisen. The country was in the grip of an
economic depression, and lawyers, in that they represented fore-
closing creditors, were largely blamed for it. American legal
education had been slow to develop and there were still few books
published, either statutes or decisional law. Public distrust of
lawyers, some of it justified, developed to such an extent that
there were punitive efforts in several of the legislatures in the
new states to curtail, or even eliminate, the practice of law
altogether. Mr. Chroust says that the only bright spot in the
otherwise dismal picture of the legal profession in the years just
following the Revolution was the establishment of a federal bar.
The era of the John Marshall Court was opening and the land-
mark constitutional decisions which it was to render were to be
molded largely by the ability and the resourcefulness of the law-
yers who argued them in the Supreme Court. There were truly
"giants in those days."
One of the most interesting chapters in the book then takes
us into the practice of law on the frontier. The bench was a
[Vol. 18
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handhewn bench and the judge who sat on it was usually a local
Indian fighter, with little education and certainly no legal
training, who owed his position purely to his ability to manifest
authority. Court day was a social and sporting event and one
of the main purposes of the judge was to keep things interesting
for the spectators. Mr. Chroust says: "Probably each Court Day
produced as many new cases as it settled-or tried to settle-
old ones." Despite the physical hardships and the meagerness of
fees (fifty cents for drawing a deed, three dollars for trying a
case before a justice of the peace), and in the teeth of public
resentment of lawyers engendered partly by "Jacksonian Demo-
cracy," the profession eventually prospered in the frontier
country. The excitement of it took many leaders of the bar to
the west-John Breckenridge from Virginia to Kentucky and
the founder of the Taft dynasty to Ohio. The roots were thus
laid not only for strong courts but for strong local governments
in general.
Mr. Chroust actually ends his chronological account of the
fortunes of the bar at about the year 1840. He adds a summary
chapter dealing with the bar associations and other machinery
(usually weak) to control the practice, and a similar chapter
tracing the development of legal training in America. Both are
excellent, but one is left perplexed at the sharp cut-off of the
general history at 1840. Surely the author is not saying that
the legal profession has not "risen" in this country since that
date. It has, demonstrably.
JAEs F. DnErER
Lecturer in Law
University of BSouth fCarolina
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George D. Haimbaugh, Jr., Associate Professor of Law,
University of South Carolina, Vice Presidential Succession:
A Criticism of the Bayh-Cellar Plan $.50.
A widely circulated explanation of the sufficiency of con-
stitutional machinery to maintain the integrity of the presi-
dential office. Professor Haimbaugh explores the Bayh-Cellar
plan and points out inherent defects.
Send Order To
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
School of Law
University of South Carolina
Columbia, S. C. 29208
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